Cybergibbons

A connected ape
 

Links to Burzynski Clinic Quackery stories

Just spreading some linkin' love:

 

Posted November 28, 2011
 

Strangest boardroom in London?

Every few months or so, I trawl several film location databases to find new places to look round. 95% of the sites are of no interest, and only a few of the remaining 5% can easily be found.

This place, off the Itasca location database, really got my interest with the strange turret like structure - it really looks like prison watchtower or similar.

Itasca_30001_001

So, it looks like a board room in there. Where's the stairs though? What does that sign say "SLIDE TABLE TO OPEN FIRE EXIT"?

Itasca_30001_009

Oh right, so you actually slide the table apart to get to the stairs...

Itasca_30001_010
And down we go...

Itasca_30001_011

Imagine needing to go for a wee during a meeting.

For those interested, this is the old Fulton umbrella factory, just in the shadow of the Canary Wharf estate. I think it was vacated sometime last year.

Posted November 13, 2011
 

Nadine Dorries bends the truth to support her agenda on social media

Nadine Dorries has passed comment on social media and the recent civil unrest. It's an interesting topic, and one that could be debated for many hours. However, keeping to form, she bases her arguments on untruths and presents opinion as fact.

Her statement:

During 7/7, mobile networks were instantly closed down.

Is false.

The 7 July Review Committee in their report stated:

We subsequently found out that in fact ACCOLC had been activated, by the City of London Police, on the O2 network in a 1km area around Aldgate Station

ACCOLC, according to wikipedia is:

ACCOLC (Access Overload Control) is a procedure in the United Kingdom for restricting mobile telephone usage in the event of emergencies. It is similar to the GTPS (Government Telephone Preference Scheme) for landlines.

This scheme allows the mobile telephone networks to restrict access in a specific area to registered numbers only and is normally invoked by the Police Incident Commander (although it can be invoked by the Cabinet Office). The emergency services are responsible for registering their key numbers in advance.

Also in that report:

The O2 network was closed ... at about noon, and remained closed until 4:45pm

That is neither instant (the first bomb was at approx 0850) or across more than one network, or in anything but a very small area.

Also, evidence given at the inquest (yes, this is protectively marked restricted and is on a gov.uk website):

Accolc

Posted August 16, 2011
 

Nadine Dorries bends the truth to support her agenda on social media

Nadine Dorries has passed comment on social media and the recent civil unrest. It's an interesting topic, and one that could be debated for many hours. However, keeping to form, she bases her arguments on untruths and presents opinion as fact.

Her statement:

During 7/7, mobile networks were instantly closed down.

Is false.

The 7 July Review Committee in their report stated:

We subsequently found out that in fact ACCOLC had been activated, by the City of London Police, on the O2 network in a 1km area around Aldgate Station

ACCOLC, according to wikipedia is:

ACCOLC (Access Overload Control) is a procedure in the United Kingdom for restricting mobile telephone usage in the event of emergencies. It is similar to the GTPS (Government Telephone Preference Scheme) for landlines.

This scheme allows the mobile telephone networks to restrict access in a specific area to registered numbers only and is normally invoked by the Police Incident Commander (although it can be invoked by the Cabinet Office). The emergency services are responsible for registering their key numbers in advance.

Also in that report:

The O2 network was closed ... at about noon, and remained closed until 4:45pm

That is neither instant (the first bomb was at approx 0850) or across more than one network, or in anything but a very small area.

Also, evidence given at the inquest (yes, this is protectively marked restricted and is on a gov.uk website):

[[posterous-content:dfvlFsJgmcFerjzqsjky]]

Posted August 16, 2011
 

Mid-air heist

Browsing the Daily Mail website to find amusing stories about how anyone brown is out to ruin society, I came across an interesting story about a mid-air heist. A passenger on a small plane removed panels from the toilet, climbed into the hold, and stole a large sum of cash in transit. Very Hollywood.

It seems that the plane was a small ATR-42 turboprop plane - which normally only has one toilet. It must have been quite hard for him to monopolise it for the entire journey. I also wonder how he got the tools onboard to enable him to get into the hold - maybe the small airport security isn't too rigourous? Also, where did he conceal such a large amount of cash when leaving the plane?

I like the idea of stealing high value items from the hold of a passenger plane. I can see many advantages - the cover of engine noise, the delay in being found out, the assumption that once the cargo is on the plane, it is safe. But on how many planes is this even possible? Outside of the Hollywood portrayal of cargo spaces (Air Force 1, Flightplan etc.), how many can be easily accessed from the passenger space?

On a side note, I have remembered how much I love cutaway diagrams:

 

 

Posted March 6, 2011
 

TV Licensing, bit of a security lapse

I just had the TV Licensing man knock on the door. Their database has been looking at us, because we don't have a license at this address. We do, however, have a license at our old address (despite which, the letters keep on arriving).

I inspected his ID. Their IDs are crap, and would be almost trivial to forge.

So I told him our old address and postcode. At this point, no names had been mentioned.

He then says, OK, I will transfer it across to the new address. He then turns the palmtop device round to me to show the transfer. I can see our details on the screen, so he clearly has access to the database and is probably for real.

But I have now transferred the license without knowing anything but an address and postcode. Are there going to be any further steps to authorise this process? Probably not.

So, if they knock on your door and you are sans-license, just make up an address and hope for the best...

Posted June 30, 2010
 

Full disclosure?

Today I am doing anti-money laundering training. This comprises of
several things:
1. What is money laundering.
2. Why you shouldn't do it.
3. How to spot money laundering.

Now, prior to today I only vaguelly knew what money laundering is. I
also just knew it was illegal, but not what others could lose from
doing it. Also I had no idea how to spot it.

But now, truth be told, all they have done is give me the information
to launder money successfully.

They have given me the motive - previously I didn't know how it
disadvantaged people. I just look at the opposite side of it and see
how it would advantage me.

They've given me the means - I now know how it works.

They've also told me how to spot it, and by extension, how to avoid
being caught.

It really does seem that all the training has achieved is keeping the
honest people honest.

I guess however, when it comes down to it I fall into that group.

Posted June 17, 2010
 

Charterhouse Aquatics - poor customer service

I just have to post this review of the customer service I received with an order at Charterhouse Aquatics over Christmas.

I ordered about £150 worth of stuff from them, called to check it was all in stock and could be delivered before Christmas. They said yes, so I placed the order online. It was on next day delivery, I took the next day off.

It didn't arrive.

I called the couriers, who assured me it would be out for delivery the next day. So I took the next day off.

It didn't arrive.

I called the couriers, they said there had been a problem and it would be on the pre-1030 delivery the next day.

It didn't arrive.

I couldn't be bothered to speak to the couriers anymore (Lee Couriers) as they seemed to just lie constantly.

I then spent the next 6 days trying to get a response from Charterhouse Aquatics. Eventually I spoke to someone, and I told them to sort the problem out or cancel the order. The online shopping experience is decided not only by the goods but by the delivery service as well.

On two further occasions the delivery didn't come when promised. One of these days I didn't even bother staying in as I knew they wouldn't be coming.

I contacted Charterhouse Aquatics to say I would contact the card company for a chargeback.

The package arrived the next day. The box was badly damaged, but nothing was broken. An item was missing - it could have fallen out of the damaged box.

I asked for them to send out another, they replied 3 days later saying they would.

A week on, no replacement item, I contacted them again. 2 days later, they reply saying another will be sent out.

This arrives 3 days later.

It was over 4 weeks from the beginning to end.

By far the worst customer service I have had shopping online:

  • Uncontactable by phone and e-mail
  • Unreliable couriers who say they will deliver but don't
  • Bad packaging
  • Couriers damage packaging
  • Missing items
  • Don't seem to care attitude
  • No apology or offer of compensation

I'd hate to see what they are like if I wanted to return an item.

http://www.charterhouse-aquatics.co.uk/
http://3.ly/charterhouseaquaticsbad
http://www.fishforums.net/index.php?/topic/316623-charterhouse-aquatics-dodgy/

Posted April 29, 2010
 

Hypocritical locksmith community still promoting security through obscurity

Locks and building security is a funny business. The fundamental goal of a lock is to only let someone with a certain key open that lock. But they are mechanical devices, so there will always be weaknesses and ways to open them without the key - that could be as simple as "carding" the bolt (bypassing the lock altogether) or as complex as single pin picking the cylinder.

The concept of a truly unpickable lock is a fallacy. After all, if a key can open it, something that assimilates the key can also open it. That's all that lock picking is - assimilating the key. All we can do is make the lock stronger or more pick resistant. This has been going on for years - 100 years ago simple warded lever locks were common, whereas now most house front doors will have a deadlocking nightlatch as well as one or more 5-lever mortise locks incorporating anti-pick features. The silly thing is there is nearly always a window that can be broken right next to the door.

Quite frequently it turns out that locks have design flaws, which make the lock far more vulnerable than it should be. Examples of this are padlock shims, comb picks and the now legendary Kryptonite ball point pen problem. What's the best policy in these situations? Keep it secret so that not even the bad guys know about it? Or tell everyone so that they can make an informed decision about upgrading their locks? The locksmith community has always promoted the security through obscurity route. Whether this is for the best or not, I don't know.

One such recent vulnerability has been termed "lock snapping". This has been known about for years. Most UPVC doors use euro profile lock cylinders - these are oval shaped cylinders which contain just the lock itself, and they are inserted into the door inside of a locking mechanism along with a handle and deadbolt. This allows the user to chose what lock to fit to the door, and makes it easy to replace. 

And there is the problem - the cylinder is removable from the lock, and hence vulnerable to attack. There are two basic methods. One is to grab the lock with a pair of mole grips (locking pliers) and bend it backwards and forwards until it snaps in the middle. The other is to drive a hardened steel screw into the keyway, and then you can pull the entire cylinder out. This can take less than 30s with practice.

Manufacturers have responded in several ways:

  • Hardened steel escutcheons prevent the lock from being grabbed onto. Generally you can still pull the cylinder with a screw.
  • Sacrificial outer sections snap off first, leaving the locking mechanism intact in the middle (Mul-T-Lock Break Secure). Again, vulnerable to the screw.
  • A laminated steel plate strengthens the cylinder (the CISA Astral range). These can still be snapped.

But as predicted, the locksmith community want to keep this under wraps. I can't work out why - there are already a large number of burglaries that are carried out using this as the method of entry - the bad guys already know how to do this. Why shouldn't people be made aware of a problem with their locks that render them practically ineffective?

Last week, a representative from Avocet locks turned up on one of the locksmith forums. He challenged anyone to come to their workshops and try to attack one of their new locks which are supposedly not vulnerable to snapping. As part of this, he posted several videos on youtube showing successful attacks against Cisa and other locks.

These videos seemed to annoy the locksmiths, despite the fact that there are loads of other videos available, and it's pretty obvious how to do it anyway. 

The best bit is, this forum is associated with a company that sells bump keys to anyone who wants them. I detect a certain level of hypocrisy here.

 

Posted February 14, 2010
 

Rip off lock picking supplies in the UK

5 years ago it wasn't possible to buy lock pick supplies in the UK unless you were a genuine trading locksmith. This has all changed now and there's quite a few places in the UK selling pick sets, bump keys, mortice picks and other tools. 

It's astounding however how bad the bulk of these websites are, and the extortionate prices that they charge.

First up, North East Locksmith Supplies.The website looks bad enough that I certainly wouldn't want to give them card details, and I'd be surprised if anything I paid for actually turned up. They sell the 32 piece Klom pick set for £32.99. Dealextreme have it for $32.49 (about £21). That's a hell of a mark up.

Next up, ukbumpkeys.com. The website is marginally better but still looks dated and cheap. They sell this set of comb picks for £14.99, which is $11.13 at Dealextreme - or about £7.50. Worse still is the price of the bump keys themselves. 6 keys will cost you £35. These are blank keys, cut deeply on a cutting machine with the shoulder ground off - if you are making 10s of them it is a very quick process. That's almost £6 a key!

But it gets worse - Walker Locksmiths. At least their website looks decent enough - but they are charging £85 + VAT for 8 bump keys. That's £12.50 for a key!

Then we have uklockpickers.co.uk - another quick look round shows the rip off prices they charge for cheap imported pick sets.

LocksRUsUK.co.uk - would anyone part with their cash on a website that looks this bad? The only upside is that some of the kits are relatively good value.

Devon Locks seems to be the best of a bad bunch - they seem to have restricted themselves to more quality products.

North East Locksmith Supplies, uklockpickers.co.uk and LocksRUsUK.co.uk don't even have an business address on their website. I bet it's pretty much impossible returning anything to them.

I can imagine this will result in me being banned from a couple of forums, but anyway.

Posted February 14, 2010